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Three Pragmatist Legacies in the
Thought of Umberto Eco
Claudio Paolucci
 
1. Eco and Pragmatism
1 Pragmatism was one of the greatest influences on Umberto Eco’s intellectual adventure.
This influence can be seen not only in his philosophical work, but also in many of the
ideas  hidden  behind  his  novels,  which,  as  Eco  himself  had  recently  admitted  by
authorising the Library of Living Philosophers to extensively cover such a topic in the
volume dedicated to him, are an important part of his philosophy. Or, perhaps, Eco’s
novels should be called a “non-philosophy” that, in his line of thinking, constitutes a
component  of  philosophy  itself  and  of  his  entirely  unique  way  of  practising  it  (see
Paolucci 2017a). Certainly, Eco always admitted the more than evident influence of Peirce
on his  semiotics  and his  thought.  And his  idea that semiotics  was a decisive part  of
philosophy, if  not the “contemporary form of philosophy” itself  (Eco 1984;  2017) was
influenced  by  Peirce’s  thought.  It  is  equally  certain  that  different  studies  have
concentrated on the relationship between Eco’s thought and that of Peirce (Proni 2015;
Pisanty & Pellerey 2004; Paolucci 2017b and Auxier, in this volume), shedding light on the
connections between them, from the more evident to least obvious and immediate. In
addition,  the numerous dialogues that Eco had always tried to put together with the
greatest  exponents  of  American  philosophy  inspired  by  pragmatism,  from  Quine  to
Putnam (see Eco 1984; 1997) on down to that with Richard Rorty,1 which even lead to an
important  book  on  “interpretation  and  over-interpretation”  (Eco  2002),  are  just  as
evident.
2 However, Eco’s relationship with pragmatism was not limited to the single relationship
with an author (however decisive it may have been for his thought), to the returning to a
series of topics and problems, or to the dialogue with a group of philosophers that had
always had great esteem for pragmatism. Quite to the contrary,  in my opinion, Eco’s
thought was radically pragmatist in its ways and intentions and, on a deeper level, even
Three Pragmatist Legacies in the Thought of Umberto Eco
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
1
in its specific style of thinking. It is no coincidence that Eco owed many of his theoretical
turning points to the pragmatists, and not just Peirce.
3 His meeting with Dewey, who Eco credits, in his philosophical autobiography, with his
liberation from a certain way of thinking of Italian culture at the time, can stand in as an
illustrative  example.2 It  is  certainly  worth reading  this  account  in  the  words  of  Eco
himself.
I was interested in the study of aesthetics and, naturally, all beginners had to read
the idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce. Even at that time I was beginning to think
that Croce had not understood much about art, and in that sense I was rebelling
against contemporary Italian culture, which still lay within the idealist camp. This
was  the  reason  why,  in  order  to  elude  the  influence  of  German  idealist
philosophers,  who were mandatory reading for all  Italian philosophy students,  I
(like  many  others  of  my  generation)  went  in  for  French  and  Anglo-American
philosophy.  In  my  university  years  reading  Dewey’s  Art  as  Experience was  a
liberation for me. (Eco 2017: 6)
4 And it is from the ideas of Art as Experience that, through his meeting with Luigi Pareyson,
Eco was able to manage the true revolution for aesthetics that The Open Work was first for
Italian culture and subsequently for European culture (see Paolucci 2017a, chapter 4).
5 The discussion around semiotics is not much different. In order to criticise the Croce-
derived idea of art as intuition, Eco was inspired by Pareyson’s idea of interpretation. For
Pareyson, not only was art not an introspective intuition which exhausts itself in internal
elaboration,  whereas its  technical-material  externalization is  completely accessory,  as
Croce used to think. But, according to Pareyson “artistic production is not the sudden
outcome of a not otherwise defined intuition but is, rather, a process of trial and error,
and the patient questioning of a preexisting material” (Eco 2017: 18).
6 It  was  then  Peirce’s  semiotics  –  anti-Cartesian  essays  and  the  works  on  abductive
reasoning in particular – that Eco placed his trust in to further develop, epistemologically
and cognitively speaking, all the points which were so decisive for him. And he always
held  great  gratitude  for  the  father  of  American  pragmatism.  According  to  Peirce:  i)
interpretation is a form of trial/error that has the shape of an abductive gamble and of
the fallibility  of  a  hypothesis;  ii)  interpretation as  inference is  the exact  opposite  of
intuition,  which  is  instead  a  “cognition  that  has  not  been  determined  by  previous
cognitions”; iii) the same “idea present to the mind,” whether this be a representative
thought or internal introspection, is never an intuition at all, but rather a sign derived
from hypothetical inference starting from some external state.
7 Eco turned these three points into the very cornerstones of his semiotics and never let go,
even after the cognitive reflections of Kant and the Platypus, which would have been able
to inspire a return to a certain pre-semiotic form of intuition (see Eco 2007; Paolucci
2015). The same idea of interpretation, which would then become the label for his way of
practising semiotics (interpretative semiotics),  comes from here, from these problems
and from these reflections.
The process-based approach to creation implies a similarly trial- and process-based
notion  of  the  response  to  the  completed  work,  namely,  its  interpretation.  This
concept is central to Pareyson’s aesthetics precisely because he takes into account
the interaction between a world of forms (be they natural or produced by human
beings)  and  the  presence  of  human  interpretive  activity.  The  notion  of
interpretation, in Pareyson’s view, is very broad and implies the enjoyment of the
work of art, its possible performance, as well as its critique, and the translation of a
text. Pareyson never quoted Peirce but the former’s concept of interpretation led to
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my being won over by Peirce’s notion of the interpretant,  which (as we shall see)
permeated my later semiotic approach. (Eco 2017: 18-9; original emphasis)
8 However, the relationship with pragmatism and with the pragmatists wasn’t necessary
for Eco simply to incite revolutions and, thus, to accelerate thought towards something
new and unexpected,  but also to put the brakes on it,  in order to reject  intellectual
models that, in the era Eco was writing in, were colonising the cultural world. Thanks to
pragmatism, Eco used to refuse ideas which he certainly did not consider desirable, even
if they were at the centre of the cultural world.
9 Among the many contenders, the most important example is that of “Deconstruction.”
Eco was among the first to speak of “open work” and of the interpreter as a sort of co-
author of the work itself. However, Eco was never willing to accept Derrida’s positions on
these topics, and the most heated debate on his positions – in which Eco tried to refute
Derrida’s theses – is seen in the interpretation of Peirce’s famous passage about “symbols
grow” (CP 2.302), which Derrida had analytically commented on in Of Grammatology. Eco,
who had dedicated the very essence of his semiotic theory of interpretation to the idea of
“infinite semiosis,” appealed directly to the pragmatist idea of habit as a logical-final
interpreter  able  to  stabilise  and  dampen the  interpretation,  with  the  aim of  not  to
acquiesce to the Derridean idea that Peirce was a precursor to the “deconstruction of the
transcendental signified, which at one time or another would place a reassuring end to
the reference from sign to sign” (Derrida 1967: 54). In this regard, Eco carries over the
Peircean  definition  of  lithium,  “what  you  are  to  do  in  order  to  gain  a  perceptive
acquaintance with the object of the word” (CP 2.330) and insists on the transcendental
role of the “community as an intersubjective guarantee of a non-intuitive, non-naively
realistic, but rather conjectural notion of truth” (Eco 1990: 39).
10 There isn’t  enough room here to go analytically through all  the places in which the
encounters with pragmatism and American philosophy were decisive in Eco’s work.3 For
this, I’ll take another route and try to identify three large legacies of pragmatism which
were central in Eco’s thought and which shaped and influenced his philosophy to its
foundations. The three of Eco’s overarching ideas that are marked in their very essence
by  pragmatic  legacy  are:  i)  the  non-separation  of  semantics  and  pragmatics;  ii)  the
centrality of abduction for cognition and semiotic thought; iii) synechism, or rather, the
continuity between mind and world that Eco was unwilling to allow on a theoretical level,
but which he explicitly puts on stage in narration.
 
2. Semantics, Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Maxim
11 At first glance, it seems paradoxical to ascribe pragmatism’s legacy to the consideration
of pragmatics as a part of semantics, seeing as the three-pronged division into syntax,
semantics and pragmatics derives from Charles Morris’ interpretation of certain ideas
coming from Peirce. And yet, Eco never loved Morris to the degree he viscerally loved
Peirce and his pragmatism, and a few of Peirce’s ideas coming from the very foundation
of pragmatism were the ground of Eco’s idea that pragmatics was part of semantics.
12 Personally, I’m firmly convinced that the non-separation of semantics and pragmatics is
one of the most crucial ideas of Eco’s semiotic legacy, one which hasn’t been sufficiently
considered and valued within a semantic landscape that uses Morris’ tripartition as a
starting point, if not a true cornerstone. I am also convinced that Eco’s idea is the direct
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result of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, which, in A Theory of Semiotics, Eco applies to the most
modern problems of cognitive semantics.
13 Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is in fact a theory of meaning: “Consider what effects, that
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
[…] There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible
difference of practice.” (CP 5.402). 
14 In Seventies-era semantics, there was a tendency to enthusiastically distinguish between
the meaning of a sign from its usage in language. Meaning wasn’t about usage, and usage
was actually  a  question of  pragmatics,  not  semantics.  This  division tended to  create
numerous further distinctions, which Eco used to consider entirely artificial, such as that
between dictionary and encyclopaedia and that between “knowledge of language” and
“knowledge of the world” (see Eco 1975; 1984). We will start with the latter distinction:
according to the semantic theories that Eco was opposed to, a knowledge of the language
(dictionary) would concern the fact that a bachelor is an “unmarried male adult,” while a
knowledge of the world (encyclopaedia) would concern the fact that the author of this
essay is a bachelor. According to Katz (1972), who is the author of a semantic theory that
embodies the polemic goal of A Theory of Semiotics, encyclopaedic knowledge cannot be
part of the meaning of a word since, as there are always new discoveries about the world
(and  thus  new  uses  of  words  which  have  become  the  subject  matter  of  common
knowledge),  this  knowledge  and  these  uses  should  be  included  in  the  semantic
representation of a lexical item. For Katz, it was something that should not and must not
be done, but, according to Eco (1975: 143-4), this was the very work of semantics itself.
For  this  very purpose,  in  A Theory  of  Semiotics,  Eco (1975:  152-72)  tries  to  propose a
semiotic model founded on “coding contexts and circumstances.” As we will now see,
these codified contexts and circumstances represent those very “conceivable practical
effects” that, according to Peirce, identify meaning.
15 Let me unpack this point a bit. Eco’s Reformulated Semantics Model (1975) inserts all of a
sign’s accepted meanings, along with the contextual and circumstantial selections that
make it possible for us to use it within concrete linguistic practices (usages), into the
semantic representation of that sign. “Contextual selections” make it possible to activate
the  correct  meanings  in  function  of  the  other,  co-existing  meanings  of  the  sign  in
question. Meanwhile, “circumstantial selections” make it possible to activate the correct
meanings  in  function  of  the  events  and  objects  that  co-exist  in  concrete  linguistic
practices. More generally, “the way to represent the meaning of a sign-vehicle x is ‘if x
then, according to the following circumstances and contexts, the following interpretants
will be activated’” (Eco 2017: 23). As such, the conceivable interpretative activity of the
speaker, with the possible ways he could use language, becomes part of the semantic
representation of a sign-vehicle, exactly like encyclopaedic knowledge, in its regularity,
becomes  a  ineliminable  component  of  semantics.  It  is  a  completely  Eco-like  way  of
interpreting the Peircean idea that, in order to determine the meaning of something, the
conceivable practical effects must be determined.
Thus, according to Eco, the circumstantial and contextual selections have nothing to do
with the empirical contexts and the empirical circumstances in which a word is used. For
Eco, meaning is not related in any way to empirical uses, with “the practical effects of
signs,” but rather with the conceivable empirical uses, with the conceivable practical effects
of signs, which Eco calls “the codes of contexts and circumstances.” It is clear how Eco is
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thinking here through Peirce’s pragmatism and not through its version by William James
(Sini 1971; Maddalena, Calcaterra & Marchetti 2015). Meaning, in fact, does not consist in
the identifiable practical effects of using a word. To the contrary, meaning consists in the
conceivable practical effects, in other words (in Eco’s semantic terminology), in the coding
of contexts and circumstances, and thus in the concepts of the possible uses of a sign that
are culturally and conventionally considered more probable.
The theory does not have to list and to structure all the possible occurrences of a
given item but only those which are culturally and conventionally recognized as
the more statistically probable. (Eco 1975: 110)
16 Eco  does  not  dissolve  meaning  in  its  practical  effects,  just  as  he  does  not  dissolve
semantics  in  the  empirical  uses  of  speakers.  Rather,  he  thinks  that  pragmatics,
understood  as  a  conceivable  whole  of  the  regularities  of  usage,  is  a  constitutive
component of meaning. For this reason, proper semantic representation must consider
pragmatics to be a constitutive part  of  semantics itself.  It  is  on this  topic that Eco’s
pragmatist inspiration is not only evident, but sows the seed of what in my opinion is one
of the most important ideas of semiotic semantics.
 
3. Abduction
17 In Paolucci  (2010;  2012),  I  have tried to reconstruct  the profound evolution that  the
concept  of  abduction  underwent  within  Peirce’s  thought.  Initially  thought  of  as  the
inference of the minor premise of a “Barbara” syllogism starting from the major premise
and the conclusion, abduction became, according to the mature Peirce, a “strange salad”
able to hold together i) a “token-type” logical movement, ii) an analogical “token-token”
movement,  and iii)  the art of  fantasizing able to connect heterogeneous universes of
experience that  Peirce would call  musement.  In this  latter form (that  of  the “strange
salad”),  abduction  became  for  Peirce  the  true  driving  force  behind  the  process  of
cognition, representing the very fulcrum of semiosis.
18 It is therefore no coincidence that Eco dedicated numerous years and many studies to
capturing the complexity internal to Peirce’s concept of abduction, trying to classify its
potential variants and to use them in every phase of his intellectual adventure, from
philosophy to semiotics to novels. Let us take a look at how The Name of the Rose is an
example based on this work on the idea of abduction.4
19 If I were to vote for a work of reference on these topics, I would not hesitate to choose
“Corna, zoccoli, scarpe,” an article originally published in the anthology The Sign of Three
(then republished in The Limits of Interpretation), that, in my opinion, is also one of the
most extraordinary essays by Eco the philosopher and semiotician. According to Eco, the
idea of abduction has to do with that form of reasoning and interpretive process in which,
standing before an unknown, surprising event that requires explanation, one (fallibly)
gambles that this event could be the case of a rule (see CP 2.624). If the abduction is
verified, thus discovering that the unknown event is effectively the case of that rule, that
event  thereby stops  being surprising.  For  Eco,  abduction is  therefore  an example  of
reasoning through which the unknown is brought back to the known, and “rules are
produced to be able to interpret” (Eco 1997, chapter 2). However, and this is the real
interesting part,  according to Eco,  abduction is a sort of umbrella term, as there are
different types that show up for different types of risks and benefits.
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20 In “Corna, zoccoli, scarpe,” Eco provides one important classification, founded on a four-
way partition. He calls the first type of abduction “hyper-codified.” In this form, the rule
is given and it  is even codified and attested to,  for which the abductive reasoning is
effectively  resolved  in  a  token-type  relationship,  in  which  the  unknown  event  is
interpreted as the token of a general type that represents the law.
21 The second type of abduction is “hypo-codified.” Here the relationship between case and
rule is not codified and there are different possible rules, often equiprobable, which are
made available to us by the semiotic encyclopaedia as a format of the “current knowledge
of  the  world.”  The  example  which  Eco  gives  for  this  type  of  abduction  is  Kepler’s
discovery of the elliptic nature of the orbit of Mars.
When Kepler discovered the ellipticity of the orbit of Mars, he met a surprising fact
(the  initial  positions  of  the  planet),  then  he  had  to  choose  between  various
geometrical  curves,  whose  number  was  not  infinite,  however.  Some  previous
assumptions about the regularity of the universe suggested to him that he had to
look only for closed not transcendental curves (planets do not make random jumps
and do not proceed by spirals or sine waves). (Eco 1983: 207)
22 The third type is “creative” abduction, in which it is the rule itself that must be created ex
novo. According to Eco, this type of abduction is found in all revolutionary discoveries,
whether they are scientific,  historic  or literary.  This  type of  abduction is  interesting
because the type is  not  given,  but  it  must  be  in  turn posed or  constructed,  making
abduction a fallible way to construct rules in order to be able to interpret and make sense
of unknown, surprising results.
23 However, the most extraordinary type of abduction, the one in which Eco strikes gold, is
the fourth and final form, which Eco calls “meta-abduction.”
It consists in deciding as to whether the possible universe outlined by our first-level
abductions is the same as the universe of our experience. In over- and under-coded
abductions, this meta-level of inference is not compulsory, since we get the law
from a storage of already checked actual world experience. In other words, we are
entitled by common world knowledge to think that, provided the law is the suitable
one, it already holds in the world of our experience. In creative abductions we do
not have this kind of certainty. We are making a complete “fair guess” not only
about  the  nature  of  the  result  (its  cause)  but  also  about  the  nature  of  the
encyclopedia (so that, if the new law results in being verified, our discovery leads to
a  change  of  paradigm).  As  we  shall  see,  meta-abduction  is  not  only  crucial  in
“revolutionary” scientific discoveries but also (and normally) in criminal detection.
(Eco 1983a: 207)
Meta-abduction is abduction that has another abduction as its object and which presumes
parallelism between worlds: it is first necessary to gamble on a possible explanation that
creates a coherent story, which, however, we don’t know if it corresponds effectively to
the facts at hand (abduction object). It is then necessary to gamble that this abduction,
object of the first wager, outlines a possible world that one gambles will be the same
world  as  reality  (meta-abduction).  For  this,  Eco  (1983)  talks  about  “a  sick  Spinozist
universe” in which ordo et connexio idearum (the world outlined by our first abduction)
idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum (the real world). Meta-abduction is the bet that the world
we have hypothesized in our conjectures is one and the same as the real world. This
parallelism between mind and world, which, as we will soon see, constitutes the very
essence of Peircean synechism, is the mechanism that presides over the abductions of
William of Baskerville and Jorge de Burgos in the extraordinary finale of The Name of the
Rose. This further demonstrates that the relationship with pragmatism influenced Eco’s
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thought  on  every  level,  including  narrative.  Indeed,  the  prime  example  of  meta-
abduction for Eco can be found in detective stories. It is no coincidence, then, that when
Eco writes his, he has Borges’ Death and the Compass in mind, which not by chance inspired
the evil blind librarian who is the protagonist of the novel’s finale.
To be sure that the detective’s mind has reconstructed the sequence of events and
laws as  they should have been,  you have to harbor a  profound persuasion that
“ordo et connexio rerum idem est ac ordo et connexio idearum.” The movements of
our mind that investigates follow the same laws of reality. If we think “well,” we are
obliged to think according to the same rules that connect things among themselves.
If a detective identifies with the mind of the murderer he can only get to the point
to which the murderer gets. In this Spinozan universe the detective is not just the
one who understands what the murderer has done (because he could not fail to do
that,  if  there  is  a  logic  to  the  mind and things).  In  this Spinozan universe  the
detective will also know what the murderer will do tomorrow. And he will go to
wait for him at the place of his next crime. But if the detective can reason this way,
so can the murderer: who can do things in such a way that the detective goes to
wait for him in the place of his next crime, except that the victim of the murderer’s
next crime will be the detective himself. And this is what happens in “Death and the
Compass.” (Eco 1983b: 170)
24 This is also the case in The Name of the Rose. Having understood that William of Baskerville
had gambled that the murderer was following the “scheme of the Apocalypse” for his
crimes, Jorge de Burgos begins following the scheme himself,  even if all  the previous
murders were actually the result of chance and not an elaborate or preconceived plan.
25 Yet,  according  to  Eco,  there  is  one  major  difference  regarding  the  force  of  meta-
abduction when it operates within the real world or when it operates within the fictional
world, as is the case in his novel. It is certainly possible to create meta-abductions in the
real world as well, and Eco cites not only certain scientific discoveries as paradigmatic
examples,  but  also  historic  discourse  and  conjectures  from the  history  of  medicine.
However, unlike that which happens in the real world, a detective like Sherlock Holmes
never makes mistakes and he never hesitates to meta-gamble that the world which he has
charted out is the same as the “real” world, since he has the privilege of living in a world
constructed  by  his  inventor,  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle,  who  constantly  verifies  all
hypotheses. In the real world, on the other hand, there is nothing which corresponds to
the author of a novel, unless one wants to assume the point of view of God, something
which Eco is not willing to do and which had already consumed his distancing from the
Christian thought of his teacher, Luigi Pareyson. Pareyson believed in the existence of a
“creator” who authored the shapes of the world, analogous to the author of a novel, able
to ensure the abductive reasoning of his “characters.” Precisely because he is unwilling to
make this move, Eco feels the need to insist – consistently and on more than one occasion
– that meta-abductions are dangerous and should always be verified empirically, just as




26 From this topic, there is one more point of contact between Eco’s reflections and those of
pragmatism. Peirce was convinced that all human beings have a sort of “lume naturale,” a
natural  instinct  to  guess  correctly,  as  our  brain  evolved  in  accordance  with  things
themselves. This leads to the most decisive metaphysical and epistemological idea from
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the  mature  Peirce,  who considered  it  the  very  key  of  his  own philosophical  system
(Maddalena 2009):  the existence of continuity between mind and world.  According to
Peirce, the mind is the part of the world through which the world represents itself. It is
not by chance that, like the mind, the world also tends to taken on habits, and thus has a
“tendency to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in the future” (CP
5.487).  In  this  regard,  Eco,  analysing  Peirce’s  synechism  and  its  relationship  with
pragmatism in The Role of the Reader, noted how the logical-final interpretant for Peirce
always expresses “the same law governing the Dynamic Object.” This is why we have a
natural instinct to guess correctly, as our mind follows the same laws according to which
the world is itself organised.
27 However, even if he perfectly knew these ideas, Eco never wanted to follow in Peirce’s
footsteps on this matter. He always professed disagreement both with the idea of a lume
naturale and with the ability to guess correctly guaranteed by a mind that is naturally in
harmony with the structure of  things (Eco 1983b:  334-9).  This is  why,  for Eco,  meta-
abductions were always “a worrying question” (Eco 1983a: 258). There is nothing in the
structure of the world or in that of evolution that guarantees our conjectures. To the
contrary, in Eco’s opinion, man is structurally devoted to falsity and error, constantly
running the risk of remaining a victim of his own semiotic creations, which he uses to try
to decipher the disorder of the world, but which often do nothing besides show him his
own signs and references. This is the “force of falsity” that Eco always puts on stage in his
novels.  Starting  from false  ideas  and incorrect  conjectures,  man is  certainly  able  to
discover many truths, but these discoveries are often the result of chance and error, just
like those of William of Baskerville, who manages to truly discover the murderer of the
abbey and his mysteries by following the false scheme of the Apocalypse.
28 Thus, as I tried to show in Paolucci 2017, for Eco, synechism is not a constitutive principle
(as  it  was  for  Peirce),  but  rather  a  regulative one.  We  act  “as  if”  our  conjectures
correspond to the structure of the real world. We would be unable to gain experience
without this meta-abductive gamble. However, there is nothing in the structure of the
world that guarantees the Spinozan parallelism that serves to secure our abductions, just
as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle did with those of Holmes. In the real world, unlike that of
fiction, synechism is something that we tentatively try to impose on the world’s chaos in
order to produce an order,  without,  however,  any guarantee that  this  order actually
exists.
I have never doubted the truth of signs, Adso; they are the only thins man has with
which to orient himself in the world. What I did not understand was the relation
among signs.  I  arrived  at  Jorge  through an  apocalyptic  pattern  that  seemed to
underlie all the crimes, and yet it was accidental.  I  arrived at Jorge seeking one
criminal for all the crimes and we discovered that each crime was committed by a
different person, or by no one. I arrived at Jorge pursuing the plan of a perverse
and rational mind, and there was no plan, or, rather, Jorge himself was overcome
by his own initial design and there began a sequence of causes, and concauses, and
of  causes  contradicting  one  another,  which  proceeded  on  their  own,  creating
relations that did not stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? I behaved,
stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have known well that
there is no order in the universe […] The order that our mind imagines is like a net,
or like a ladder, built to attain something. But afterward you must throw the ladder
away, because you discover that, even if it was useful, it was meaningless. (Eco 1980:
426)
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29 This  is  why  Eco  finds  it  necessary  to  “laugh  at  the  truth”:  truth,  being  a  form  of
correspondence between intellect and things on the one side and between the mind and
the world on the other side, is a form of order that we try to impose on the world to gain
experience. However, many other orders are possible. This is why it is always a good idea
not  to  take  just  one too seriously.  One order  may seem to  be  particularly  stable  or
reasonable to us, so we may think that this is the truth. However, according to Eco, the
truth is often nothing other than an attested version of the world which is the effect of
research that must never be interrupted, but which should always be entrusted to the
uncertain logic of interpretation and conjecture.
 
5. This Issue
30 Insofar as in this piece I  have tried to shine some light on three aspects that,  in my
opinion,  are  anything  but  banal  in  terms  of  the  relationship  between  Eco  and
pragmatism, it is clear that the authors participating in this issue of the European Journal
of  Pragmatism and  American  Philosophy will  investigate  the  relationship  between Eco’s
thought and that of American pragmatist traditions from their own points of view. 
31 For instance,  Randall  Auxier works on the relationship between Eco and Peirce,  with
special attention to semiotics, introducing an original interpretation of many ideas about
this topic. Francesco Bellucci also works on a classic topic, that lies at the heart of the
relationship between Eco and pragmatism: the idea of abduction and the justification of
abductive  reasoning.  Bellucci  argues  that  both  Peirce  and  Eco  solved  this  problem
through the idea that the justification of abduction is itself abductive. 
32 Also Valentina Pisanty deals with one major theoretical problem, the “keeping together”
of Structuralism and Pragmatism inside Umberto Eco’s work. In order to account for that,
Pisanty  introduces  the  idea  of  bisociation, that,  though never  an  item of  Eco’s  own
philosophical toolbox, plays an important role in the creation of a possible/impossible
graft between Structuralism and Pragmatism. 
33 Conversely, Martin Švantner deals with the late Eco’s ideas on semiotics, connected to
cognitive  sciences  and  to  the  problem  of  qualia.  In  his  view,  Eco  started  to  focus
specifically on the problem of qualia mostly in his later period when he turned from the
idea of  almost universal  theory of  semiotics  (as  in A Theory of  Semiotics)  to cognitive
realism (in  Kant  and  the  Platypus)  with  the  help  of  more  precise  reinterpretation  of
Peirce’s concepts.
34 Also Rossella Fabbrichesi’s  paper deals with a late idea of  Umberto Eco’s production,
negative realism. According to Fabbrichesi, Eco’s appeal to Peirce’s distinction between
Immediate and Dynamical Object is contaminated by a common-sense interpretation of
what ‘real’ is, which is note what Peirce had in mind with his distinctions.
35 Robert Innis’ work challenges one main idea, which is also at the basis of this issue of the
EJPAP.  According  to  Innis,  Umberto  Eco’s  relation  to  pragmatism  as  such  is  quite
tangential if we ignore the pivotal role of Peirce in defining and supporting Eco’s explicit
semiotic turn. Innis sees in the gradually lost of the trail of Dewey, that we have seen
playing a pivotal role for the young Eco, a major problem and also indicates how Dewey’s
work could have played a larger role in Eco’s mature aesthetic thought.
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36 Finally, Lucio Privitello’s paper, “A Musement on Eco’s Pragmatism,” is so original, smart
and entertaining that it is not worth to tell nothing else to the reader apart from the
invitation to enjoy it.
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NOTES
1. See Calcaterra 2017.
2. See Robert Innis’ paper in this issue for a detailed account on that.
3. I partially have done so in my book, Umberto Eco. Tra Ordine e Avventura (Paolucci 2017a).
4. Comparable examples could be made for all of Eco’s novels. On this point, see Paolucci (2017a,
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